Abstract. We discuss a modification of the Cramer-Shoup strong-RSA signature scheme. Our proposal also presumes the strong RSA assumption (and a collision-intractable hash function for long messages), but -without loss in performance-the size of a signature is almost halved compared to the original scheme. We also show how to turn the signature scheme into a "lightweight" anonymous (but linkable) group identification protocol without random oracles.
Introduction
Cramer and Shoup [CS00] have presented a signature scheme which is secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks under the strong RSA (aka. flexible RSA) assumption, and which does not rely on the random oracle model. For a 1024-bit RSA modulus and a 160-bit (hash value of a) message a signature has about 2200 bits. Cramer and Shoup also discuss a variation of their scheme which, in addition to the strong RSA assumption, requires the discrete-log assumption and which produces signatures of roughly half the length (about 1350 bits). Here, we show that we can achieve the same signature size under the strong RSA assumption only, even with a slightly improved performance than in the original strong-RSA-only case or the discrete-log & strong-RSA case.
Our signature scheme also has the feature that for short messages, e.g., of 120 bits, a collision-intractable (or universal one-way) hash function becomes obsolete. Moreover, the signing process itself becomes slightly faster. This may be interesting for identification protocols, where users identify by signing short random messages.
At the end of this paper, we touch anonymous group identification protocols in which users can prove membership in a group without disclosing their identity. We discuss how to construct a "lightweight" anonymous (yet linkable) group identification scheme from our signature scheme. Our solution does not need random oracles, and the group's common public key as well as the performance of a single identification is independent of the number of users.
Recently, Damgȧrd and Koprowski [DK02] have generalized the CramerShoup signature scheme to generic groups. To best of our knowledge, our improvements here also apply to the model of Damgȧrd and Koprowski.
In this section we recall the original Cramer-Shoup scheme, introduce our modification and prove it to be secure, and compare our proposal to the original protocol.
We adhere to the notation in [CS00] ; still, the protocol description should be intelligible without [CS00] . We remark that the strong RSA assumption says that for a random RSA modulus n and a random element z ∈ Z * n it is infeasible to find an integer e ≥ 2 and the e-th root of z in Z * n . Hence, compared to the ordinary RSA assumption where the exponent is given, a solution for the strong RSA problem allows to come up with a self-determined exponent.
Original Cramer-Shoup Signature Scheme
The original Cramer-Shoup scheme works as follows:
Key Generation: Generate n = pq, where p = 2p + 1 and q = 2q + 1 for primes p, q, p , q . Also pick two quadratic residues h, x ∈ QR n and a random (l + 1)-bit prime e . The public verfication key is (n, h, x, e ) and the private key is (p, q).
Signing: To sign a message m compute the l-bit hash value H(m) with a collision-intractable hash function H(·). Pick a random (l + 1)-bit prime e = e and a random y ∈ QR n , compute x where
as well as y with y e = xh H(x ) mod n.
Computing this e-th root is easy given the factorization of n. The signature equals (e, y, y ).
Verification: First check that e is an odd (l + 1)-bit integer different from e , then compute x = (y ) e h −H(m) and verify that x = y e h −H(m) .
Modified Cramer-Shoup Signature Scheme
One can view the value H(x ) as a trapdoor commitment of the message m, using the RSA trapdoor commitment scheme. Therefore, as pointed out in [CS00] , one may replace this part with any other appropriate trapdoor commitment. Indeed, [CS00, Sec. 5] suggest as an example a trapdoor commitment based on the discrete-log assumption. By this, the signature length shrinks to almost half of the original size. Unfortunately, this advantage disappears again if one switches to other trapdoor commitments based on the RSA or factoring assumption, or even general one-way functions.
The second part of the signature generation can be thought of as a representation problem. That is, a representation of x with respect to h, e, n is a pair (α, y) such that h α y e = x mod n. In this sense, a signature in the original protocol requires that one finds a representation of x involving the hash value −H(x ) and a self-determined exponent e. In the modified signature scheme here, we assimilate the trapdoor commitment to the representation problem:
Key Generation: Generate n = pq, where p = 2p + 1 and q = 2q + 1 for primes p, q, p , q . Also pick three quadratic residues h 1 , h 2 , x ∈ QR n . The public verfication key is (n, h 1 , h 2 , x) and the private key is (p, q).
Signing: To sign a message m calculate the l-bit hash value H(m) with a collision-intractable hash function H(·). Pick a random (l + 1)-bit prime e, a random l-bit string α and compute a representation (−α, −(α ⊕ H(m)), y) of x with respect to h 1 , h 2 , e, n, i.e.,
Computing this e-th root y from xh
is easy given the factorization of n. The signature is given by (e, α, y).
Verification:
Check that e is an odd (l + 1)-bit integer, that α is l bits long, and that y e = xh
The idea of splitting H(m) into random (but dependent) parts α and α ⊕ H(m) is not new. It has already been applied for the well-known protocol for proving knowledge of one out of two discrete logarithms [CDS94] and for security amplification lifting random-message attacks to chosen-message attacks [CDP95] . As we will discuss below, it also gives the desired trapdoor information for proving security here.
We remark that we may instead select α at random in Z e and split the message into α and α + H(m) mod e. Moreover, we may alternatively define y in the signature generation as the unique value such that x = h α 1 h α⊕H(m) 2 y e mod n, i.e., rearrange the equation to derive a "well-formed" representation problem. Our security proof also works for these variations, even when combined.
Performance Comparison
Compared to the original scheme with signature size 2|n| + l + 1, both the modification here as well as the one using the discrete-log trapdoor commitment produce signatures of size |n| + 2l + 1. Disadvantegeously, both modifications slightly increase the size of the public key, e.g., adding |n| − l bits in our case.
The same speedup techniques as in [CS00, Sec. 3, 6 and 7] apply here (e.g., faster prime number generation, taking e-th roots efficiently, precomputation techniques, etc.). In particular, selecting x = h a 1 and h 2 = h a 1 for appropriate a, a and storing a, a in the secret key, the effort to compute the e-th root of xh
is (almost) the same as in the original scheme for xh H(x ) = h a+H(x ) -and our proposal does not require the computation of the separate trapdoor commitment.
For signature verification, taking into account possible precomputations and that the discrete-log trapdoor commitment can be carried out with more efficient multiplications than in Z * n (e.g., if one works over elliptic curves or in Z * p for |p| = 768), the cost for the verifier for checking the single equation in our scheme seems to be comparable to the cost of checking the equation y e = xh H(x ) and the discrete-log trapdoor commitment.
Unfortunately, all solutions share the expensive prime generation of e. However, in our case, we can decrease the length of e at the cost of a larger public key. Namely, if we put, say, three values h 1 , h 2 , h 3 into the public key, then we can divide the hash value H(m) into halves H 1 (m)
If we choose three generators h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , then the effort for the signer to compute the e-th root y given stored values a, a , a does not change significantly in comparison to the case of two generators. But an 81-bit prime e is much easier to find than a 161-bit one. The verifier now has to perform a faster to compute "quadruple" exponentiation h y e with 161-bit exponents. Also note that if one wants to sign short messages in our protocol, say of 120 bits, then one can forgo the hash function H and choose e also as a shorter prime, e.g., 121 bits or even 61 bits with the trick above; it suffices that such random primes collide with negligible pobability only. For short primes this can be accomplished by using some state information like a counter.
Security Proof
We discuss that the modified signature scheme is secure against adaptive chosenmessage attacks. Basically, the proof follows the one in [CS00] closely.
Note that in an adaptive chosen-message attack the adversary is given the public key of the signer and can ask the signer to sign arbitrary messages. The choice of the next message submitted to this signature oracle is adaptively determined by the data gathered before. Finally, the adversary outputs a message that has not been signed by the oracle, together with a putative signature for this message.
Let m i be the i-th query to the signer and (e i , α i , y i ) denote the answer. Let m and (e, α, y) be the putative forgery of the adversary. We assume that all e i chosen by the signer during an attack are distinct (yet, the adversary's choice e may equal some e j ), and that H(m) = H(m i ) for all m i (otherwise we have found a collision m = m i ).
There are two types of forgers (dubbed according to [CS00]):
Type II: The adversary outputs e = e j for some j. Type III: The adversary outputs a new e, different from all e i .
Type I forgers as in [CS00] disappear due to our modification. We show that type II forgers contradict the (ordinary) RSA assumption, whereas type III forgers refute the strong RSA assumption.
Type II Forger
We assume that we know j, otherwise we can guess it. Since H(m j ) = H(m) we have α j = α or α j ⊕ H(m j ) = α ⊕ H(m). With probability 1/2 we can guess in advance which case will happen, and we assume for simplicity that α j = α here. The other case is treated analogously.
We are given n, z ∈ Z * n and an odd prime r and are supposed to output z 1/r . To do so, we invoke the type II forger on the following public key and signature oracle: Set e j = r and for all i = j choose a random (l + 1)-bit prime e i (where i is bounded by the number of queries to the signature oracle in the attack). Let
for random v, w ∈ Z * n and a random l-bit string β. The "prepared" public key is (n, h 1 , h 2 , x).
To sign the i-the message on behalf of the signer, i = j, select an l-bit string α i and compute
For the j-th signature query set α j = β and compute y j as
It is not hard to see that the data in this simulation is identically distributed to the one in a real attack. In particular, x and the signatures for i = j are distributed independently of β, and therefore α j in this simulation has the same distribution as in an actual attack. The adversary's output yields another representation of x with respect to n, h 1 , h 2 and e j = r. More precisely,
And, plugging in the preselected values,
Since |α − α j | ∈ Z r − {0} and all e k are relatively prime, we can compute an r-th root of z by standard procedures (see, for instance, [CS00] ).
Type III Forger
This case is almost identical to the one discussed in [CS00] . Namely, given n, z preselect all e i and set
for random a, a ∈ {1, . . . , n 2 }. As h 1 is a generator of QR n with high probability and since a, a mod p q are statistically close to the uniform distribution on Z p q , the values x, h 2 are almost uniformly distributed quadratic residues. Also, we can sign any query m i since we know the e i -th roots of xh
for any α i . On the other side, the forgery yields the equation
The fact that e |m with non-negligible probability and that we can compute a non-trivial e/gcd(e, m)-th root of z now follows as in [CS00] . Specifically, if r is a prime dividing e, then r clearly does not divide 2 · i e i . Write a as a = bp q + c for 0 ≤ c < p q and note that the adverary's view is essentially independent of b, even if given c. Hence, for a random choice of a the value b mod r is almost uniform on Z r and the probability that r|(a + α + a (α ⊕ H(m))) or, equivalently, that a + α + a (α ⊕ H(m)) = 0 mod r is negligibly close to 1/r. We conclude that with probability close to 1 − 1/r for the smallest prime factor r of e we have e |m. Once more, in this case it is easy to compute a non-trivial e/gcd(e, m)-th root of z by standard techniques.
"Lightweight" Anonymous Group Identification
With an anonymous group identification scheme each user of a group is able to prove membership in the group while hiding his identity among the group members. Below, we present an anonymous group identification scheme which does not rely on random oracles, and where both the size of the group's public key as well as the computational effort for an identification are independent of the number of users in the group. Unfortunately, our protocol is linkable in the sense that a verifier is able to decide if two identifications have been carried out by the same user (although the verifier will no be able to specify the user among the group members). Also, the group manager is able to identify on behalf of any user (besides the fact that the manager can issue keys for fake users). Still, our protocol enjoys other strong security characteristics: it is for instance secure against any number of users that actively coorperate to intrude as another honest user; details follow.
Several anonymous group identification schemes (which can be derived for example from group signature schemes) have been constructed in the past, e.g., [DDP98,BF99,ACJT00,LDZ02], each with different security and performance features. Our solution seems to excell all these protocols in performance, but at the cost of unlinkability.
The group manager in our anonymous identification scheme picks an RSA modulus n = pq of strong primes p = 2p + 1, q = 2q + 1, and a random element x ∈ QR n together with a generator h 1 of QR n . The values (n, x, h 1 ) make up the group's public key. If a user u wants to join, then the manager picks a random (l + 1)-bit prime e u and a random l-bit value α u , and computes y u such that h αu 1 y eu u = x mod n. The manager hands the pair (α u , y u ) and e u to the user.
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If a user u wants to identify as a group member to some verifier, both parties run Okamoto's RSA identification protocol [O92] on the user's key and the group's public key. That is, the user picks a ∈ Z eu , z ∈ Z * n in order to calculate A = h a 1 z eu mod n and sends this value A with e u to the verifier. 3 The verifier answers with a random challenge c ∈ Z eu and the user conclusively transmits b, B where b = a + cα u mod e u and B = zx c h (a+cαu)/eu 1 mod n. The verifier checks that e u is an odd l + 1-bit number and the correctness condition Ax c = h b 1 B eu mod n of the identification protocol. Basically, our identification protocol inherits security from our signature scheme. Think of the group manager giving each new user u a signature for random message α u . Note that this message α u is chosen by the group manager, i.e., this setting corresponds to a random-message attack. Therefore, we do not need a trapdoor commitment nor a random splitting.
If some malicious user u * , either a member or not, successfully identifies as another member using an exponent e u of an honest user u, then, by the proofof-knowledge property of Okamoto's scheme, we can extract a representation (α * , y * ) of x with respect to e u from this identification attempt. As Okamoto's identification is witness-independent, we have α u = α * with probability 1 − 2 −l for the user's secret key (α u , y u ). In this case, party u * thus forges a signature of a new message α * which is infeasible under the RSA assumption. Similarly, if u * chooses a new e u * and successfully proves membership, we obtain a successful signature forgery for message α * for this e u * , contradicting the strong RSA assumption.
We remark that security even holds with respect to malicious users u * who may adaptively decide to join controlled users, to corrupt existing parties, and run protocols with the honest users before trying to intrude. Using techniques developed in [BFGM01] , one can even extend it to the case that u * tries to intrude in the name of a user u while executing the identification protocol with that user u (in the presence of so-called session IDs).
Also note that we can add "threshold admittance levels" to our identification protocol almost for free. That is, each user u is assigned a privilege number u and this user is only allowed to enter (by means of identification) level areas for u ≥ . This feature is easy to accomplish in our scheme by demanding that, in order to enter level , the user u must identify with respect to an (l+1+ )-bit (or larger) number e u , and by letting the group manager distribute corresponding exponents to the users when joining.
